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Social capital is reputed to be a magic elixir for what ails our societies (Putnam, 2000) . It makes us healthier, wealthier, and perhaps even wiser. It is the font of a communitarian spirit that makes us look out for our fellow citizens and to work with each other, rather than against each other. Its benefits have likely been oversold-and particularly the source of these benefits seems misspecified.
The linkage between membership in civic groups and more redistributive policies seems murky at best. Why should lots of people joining bowling leagues (or local Republican party organizations) lead to better outcomes for minority groups? The logic here is not clear. But there is a more direct link with generalized trust, which I have elsewhere (Uslaner, 2002, 1) called "the chicken soup of social life." Generalized trust encompasses the belief that people who are different from us nevertheless are part of our "moral communities." We have a responsiblitity for taking care of the less fortunate; and countries with high levels of trust spend more on transfer payments from the rich to the poor and more on "redistributive" programs such as education (Uslaner, 2002, chs. 7, 8) .
Rodney Hero (2004) challenges these assumptions. He argues that social capital may be a blessing but its benefits accrue mostly to the majority (white) members of society. He presents hitherto unexplored data on outcomes for minority populations in the American states and argues that higher levels of social capital do not consistently lead to better outcomes for minorities.
Sometimes high levels of social capital are associated with more racial policy inequality.
Hero's article is an important contribution and it clearly points out some limitations in the development of the literature on social capital more generally and trust in particular. Using his data set (which he graciously shared with me) and another data set that gives reliable estimates of African-American political participation in the states, I suggest that Hero may be too pessimistic about the impact of trust on better outcomes for minorities. Yes, there are some anomalous correlations: Sometimes when states with high levels of trust do have worse outcomes for minority populations, but in more fully specified models, trust is not significant. Second, for measures of political participation, all of the aggregate state-level correlations for measures of political activity and trust are positive, whether I use trust for the entire population or just for African-Americans. Third, at least one of the anomalous results Hero presents (for the black/white school suspension ratios), seems to stem from the construction of his dependent variable . When the data are reconstructed, the anomaly vanishes.
Fourth, Hero uses Putnam's state-level measure of social capital. This indicator is a veritable dog's dinner, as the English call it, containing a bit of this (honesty, which isn't quite trust) and that (all sorts of measures of political participation). There is no effort to separate cause and effect in these surveys, or even to determine whether there is any rationale for a causal relationship among the components of the index. A more direct measure of trust is a better test of the underlying thesis that communitarian sentiments should lead to better outcomes for minorities.
Trust and Concern for Others
My view of trust (as opposed to social capital more generally) is that it is a moral value that we learn early life and is largely independent of adult experiences, including membership in voluntary associations. Moralistic (or generalized) trust is based upon "some sort of belief in the goodwill of the other" (Seligman, 1997, 43; cf. Yamigishi and Yamigishi, 1994, 131 Stolle, 1998) .
Generalized trust rests on a foundation (at the individual level) of optimism and control:
The world is a good place, it is going to get better, and I can help make it better. At the aggregate level, the roots of trust rest most clearly on economic equality: Across time and states in the United States and across nations (without a legacy of communism), economic equality is the strongest determinant of trust (Uslaner, 2002, chs. 6, 8; Uslaner and Brown, 2002) . The connection with economic equality rests on two foundations: First, optimism closely tracks levels of economic equality over time. Second, and more critically, high levels of economic inequality tear apart the bonds that bind people in a society together. As inequality increases, the belief that we have a shared fate-we are part of the same moral community--becomes untenable.
This egalitarian basis of trust (see also Seligman, 1997) leads us to care about people who are different from ourselves. Trusters are tolerant and supportive of rights for minorities that have faced discrimination (African-Americans, immigrants, women, gays, and Jews, among others). They favor programs that will make outcomes more equal, because they see American society (in particular) as marked by a common set of values and a linked fate among its many groups. Societies with high levels of trust (especially the Nordic nations such as Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland) spend more on transfer payments from the rich to the poor and on social programs such as education (Uslaner, 2002, chs. 7 and 8) .
These aspects of trust lead us to believe that there should be a powerful relationship
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between trust and policies designed to help minorities. We might also expect outcomes to be more equitable in states with higher levels of trust. Hero analyzes these policies and outcomes for the American states using Putnam's measure of social capital (rather than a direct measure of trust) and often finds little support for this argument. I argue that there is more support than he suggests.
Trust and Racial Policy Inequality
First, I discuss some data issues and then move to an analysis of some racial policies and policy outcomes in Hero's data set (including some measures he did not discuss). For a variety of Hero's indicators of policy and outcomes, I estimate regressions with trust levels, economic inequality, and the African-American turnout rate by state in the 1992 Presidential elections (in Hero's data set). I expect that trust and turnout will have positive effects on "good" policy outcomes (African-American per capita income and Aid to Families with Dependent Children payments per recipient) and negative effects on "bad" policy outcomes (high incarceration or poverty rates, among others). I expect the reverse signs for economic inequality (the Gini index measured for the 1980s). Since trust and inequality are highly correlated at the state (and other levels), I estimate some equations without economic inequality as well.
Before discussing these results, I turn to a data anomaly. Hero (2004) argues that the relative outcomes for blacks and whites are more critical than the "simple" results for either. A relative outcome of particular importance is the black/white suspension ratio in schools (how many African-Americans are suspended from schools compared to how many whites). He reports a positive relationship (significant at p < .05 for a two-tailed test, at p < .01 for a onetailed test) between the black/white suspension ratio and social capital. I plotted the measure of the black/white suspension ratio and found that the highest ratios came in states with tiny AfricanAmerican populations (the Dakotas) and the lowest ratios came in states with the largest black populations (the South). (See Figure 1. ) So using his data base, I recalculated the black/white suspension ratio, using the total numbers of African-Americans for 1992 suspended divided by the total number of all suspensions. I made a similar calculation for whites for each state and then divided the black ratio by the white. The results changed dramatically. Figure 1 shows that the original ratios (for 1998) and recalculated ratios are not strongly related: r 2 = .011. Table 1 . Trust is strongly significant for the black/white suspension ratio. Hero (2004) argues that the black-white suspension ratio is more critical than the rate for either race individually. Yet, looking at the two rates is suggestive. The simple black suspension rate has a stronger negative relationship with trust than the black-white ratio. And the white ratio is positively related to trust, although the Gini index drives the coefficient to insignificance in this estimation. Trust is also negatively related, often strongly so, to a variety of other measures of African-American policy outcomes-the rate of emotional disturbances among school children, the share with special learning disabilities, the black poverty rate, the overall poverty rate. For both measures of poverty (overall and for African-Americans), it makes little sense to include the Gini index, since the dependent and independent variables are so close. When I exclude the Gini index, the coefficients for trust become much stronger.
African-Americans fare better in states with high levels of generalized trust. They have lower poverty rates, have fewer emotional disturbances and learning disabilities, and are less likely to be suspended from school. Also, AFDC payments per recipient are higher in states with higher levels of trust. And while black per capita income is also higher in more trusting states, the relationship is no longer signfiicant when the Gini index is included in the equation.
There are a couple of other anomalies in the data analysis in Table 1 . Consistent with Hero's analysis, the black incarceration ratio is positively related to the level of trust in a state.
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States with higher levels of trust are more likely to incarcerate blacks than whites. However, the zero-order relationship is not strong ( r 2 = .164) and the coefficient is not significant in multivariate regressions. The minority infant mortality rate is correctly signed, but also insignificant.
_______________ Table 1 about here
The message in the table is that trust matters much of the time, seemingly much more often than not. And when it is significant, it brings about declines, often dramatic, in negative outcomes for racial minorities (at least for African-Americans). We should not be so quick to dismiss trust. To be sure, it is not the whole story and it may not even be the most important part of the story. African-American political mobilization, as measured by the turnout rate in the 1992
Presidential election, is more consistently significant. And its effects seem much stronger than those of trust. Yet, the story of Table 1 is that both political mobilization and trust seem to matter. Political mobilization puts the politicians on warning that they must not forget their constituents and trust provides the moral sentiments to remind people of their obligations to those with fewer resources.
Trust and Political Participation
The Roper Social and Political Trends archive asked over 200,000 respondents from 1973 to 1994 about their levels of participation in a dozen "uncommon" political activities ranging from signing a petition (most common, performed by 26 percent of respondents in 1994) to running for office (least common, accounting for fewer than one percent of respondents in 1994). Ordinarily, there is little reason to expect a strong relationship between trust and political activity. Trust taps
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cooperative sentiments. Most political activity thrives on mistrust of authority (Warren, 1996) .
And there is little reason to believe that political activity depends upon trust in fellow citizens (Uslaner, 2002, ch. 7, esp. 202 ).
However, there may be reasons to assume that there might be a link between these activities and trust. First, most of these activities are not commonly performed. In 1994, with the exception of signing a petition, no activity engaged more than 12 percent of the public; 8 of the 12 now had participation levels below 6 percent. Also, many of these activities are not as confrontational as most political activities. Writing an article for a newspaper, writing a letter to the editor, attending a public meeting, organizing a committee, serving as an officer in an organization, and making a public speech may be the mark of a public leader who can bring people together. There is some evidence that for the entire sample, states with higher levels of trust have more participa tion on these Roper items.
There is evidence in Table 2 that African-American participation (which is less than white participation) is also strongly connected to generalized trust. We have reliable measures of black participation and trust for 29 states and the correlations range from .290 for running for office to
.744 for writing a letter to the editor and .751 for comntacting public officials. The lowest correlations are for the most confrontational activities (running for office and working for a political party) and the highest are for more communal activities. When we substitute trust among African-Americans, our N drops to 17, but the correlations fall precipitously: None is higher than .490 (contacting public officials) and seven of the 12 are below .3. Ironically, perhaps, trust is most strongly related to the more confrontational activities (working for a party and running for office). The overall message is that trust among both blacks and whites seems to shape African-
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American political and social engagement more than simply trust among blacks. AfricanAmericans are more likely to participate in civic life where the social environment is more inclusive.
We see a similar pattern in Table 3 , where I report the impact of trust and civic engagement in simultaneous equation regressions for both blacks and whites. 3 The message once again is: Much of the time, there is no signficant relationship between civic participation and trust. But when there is, it is always positive. In states with higher levels of trust, African-Americans are more likely to make public speeches, to join good government organizations, and especially to write letters to the editor of newspapers and articles for the press. While trust boosts civic participation at least modestly, economic inequality strongly depresses such engagement for blacks. On all 12 of the Roper measures, states with higher levels of economic inequality have lower rates of civic engagement, often sharply so. For whites, trust matters more and economic inequality less. Trust is far lower among African-Americans than among whites: Both across states in the 1990s and in the individual-level General Social Survey from 1990 Survey from to 2002 percent of the total population believes most people can be trusted, compared to 15 percent for African-Americans. And these lower levels of trust do not go as far in stimulating civic engagement. Economic inequality depressses participation among blacks far more than it does among whites-and this should hardly be surprising.
____________________ Tables 2 and 3 about here There is an additional story not told in these tables: What matters for African-American participation is not the level of trust among blacks-or the distribution of income within the It is reassuring to see that trust functions in the American states pretty much as it supposed to do: It often leads to more redistributive policies that benefit those most at risk. And there seems to be a direct pay-off in many policy outcomes. Trust also has some positive effects on civic engagement-and, most critically, it never has negative effects. When we look beyond the handful of variables in Hero's tables, we have more reason to believe that trust does matter, and in a positive way.
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